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CONSIDERING THE COSTS: ADOPTING A JUDICIAL TEST FOR THE LEAST
RESTRICTIVE ENVIRONMENT MANDATE OF THE INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES
EDUCATION ACT
Edmund J. Rooney†
INTRODUCTION
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”)1 was implemented in
1990 as an update to the 1975 Education for All Handicapped Children Act
(“EHA”).2 Both laws were passed in order to aid state and local governments in
providing educational services to children with disabilities. They represent the
cornerstone of federal legislation in the area of special education and are important
markers in the development of special education programs in the United States that
began in the second half of the twentieth century.3
IDEA, building on the core of EHA, includes a set of six elements to develop
and guide effective special education programs. The first element is the use of
individualized education programs (“IEP”) for students with disabilities and special
educational needs. The second element is that all students be provided with a free
appropriate public education (“FAPE”). The third is that students be placed in the
least restrictive environment (“LRE”) for learning. The fourth is that appropriate
evaluations are used to assess student needs and progress. The fifth is the requirement
that teachers and parents participate in the planning and execution of a special
education program. The sixth, and final, element is a set of procedural safeguards
and rights for parents during the special education process.4
The law responds to the problem of segregation of students with disabilities that
existed when the statute was passed. This reality is reflected in the observations of
Senator Robert Stafford who stated that the EHA “represents a gallant and
determined effort to terminate the two-tiered invisibility once and for all with respect
to exceptional children in the [n]ation’s school systems.”5 Thus, the concepts of
†J.D. Candidate, Notre Dame Law School, 2020; B.A. in History and Economics, University of Illinois at
Urbana-Champaign, 2015. I would like to thank the Notre Dame Journal of Legislation staff for all of their
assistance in editing and revising this Note and my family members, especially my mother, grandmother, aunt,
and cousin, who all work or worked in special education, for inspiring my interest in this specific topic of
education law.
1 Individuals with Disabilities Education Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-446, 118 Stat. 2647 (codified as
amended at 20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq. (2004)).
2 Education for All Handicapped Children Act, Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773; OFF. OF SPECIAL EDUC.
& REHAB. SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., HISTORY: TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF PROGRESS IN EDUCATING CHILDREN WITH DISABILITIES THROUGH IDEA, (2000), http://www2.ed.gov/policy/speced/leg/idea/history.pdf
(discussing the history of special education legislation in the United States).
3 See OFF. OF SPECIAL EDUC. & REHAB. SERVS., supra note 2.
4 Cynthia L. Kelly, Individuals with Disabilities Education Act – The Right ‘IDEA’ for All Childrens’
Education, 75 J. KAN. BUS. ASS’N. 24, 27 (2006).
5 Robert T. Stafford, Education for the Handicapped: A Senator’s Perspective, 3 VT. L. REV. 71, 72
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inclusion and mainstreaming have been prominent in special education law since the
beginning. The LRE mandate specifically responds to this spirit of inclusion and
mainstreaming present in the statute. However, the parameters of the mandate and
inclusion are not entirely clear and throughout the life of EHA and IDEA there have
been issues with the application of the LRE mandate, reflected in the significant
amount of litigation regarding the mandate.6
Despite school districts’ best efforts to accommodate diverse educational needs
with limited resources, many parents still find their children’s learning environment
to not be the “least restrictive” and resort to legal remedies. Courts thus have a unique
challenge in determining and applying a standard to assess learning environments.
Accordingly, there is an important open question as to what the best judicial test is
for evaluating the IDEA LRE mandate as well as what principles should guide
Congress when updating the statute.
In resolving that question, the interests of the key stakeholders in IDEA must be
addressed. The litigation relating to the LRE implicates several key stakeholders.
The first and most obvious are children and, by extension, their parents. As the focus
of and primary participants in the educational system, children and their parents have
a strong vested interest in an LRE standard that will maximize their educational
potential. Another key stakeholder is the school district. As the purveyor of
education and the designers of educational processes, school districts and their
attendant boards, administrators, and staff have a vested interest in a standard that
will allow them to execute their mission fully and efficiently. School districts also
have increasingly complex special education programs that take up a substantial
amount of public education resources.7 Indeed, as an illustration of the significance
of special education in a large American school district, the Chicago Public Schools
budgeted $598,790,000 for “diverse learning” (the current district term for special
education) from a total budget of $3.1 billion for the 2019 fiscal year.8 Finally,
teachers unions and professional organizations that represent the educational
employees who run special education programming and work directly with students
and parents to achieve educational goals are key stakeholders. The policy statements
of the Chicago Teacher’s Union9 on special education as a local example and the
National Education Association (“NEA”)10 as a national example demonstrate the
degree of interest these professionals have in ensuring that a standard for the LRE
mandate is feasible and helpful for the students.
(1978).
6 See Brian L. Porto, Application of 20 U.S.C.A. § 1412(a)(5), Least Restrictive Environment Provision
of Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 1400 et seq., 189 A.L.R. FED. 297 (last
updated Oct. 2018).
7 See Maya Srikrishnan, Special Education Costs are Rising, NEW AM. WEEKLY (Feb. 8, 2018),
https://www.newamerica.org/weekly/edition-193/special-education-costs-are-rising/ (discussing a 50% increase in special education costs over ten years in California public schools from 2005-2016).
8 CPS Fiscal Year 2019 Budget, CHI. PUB. SCH. https://cps.edu/fy19budget/Pages/schoolsandnetworks.aspx (last modified Aug. 9, 2018).
9 See Special Education Task Force, CHI. TEACHERS UNION, https://www.ctunet.com/for-members/committees/special-education-task-force (last visited Oct. 21, 2018).
10 See Our Position & Actions on IDEA /Special Education, NAT’L EDUC. ASS’N,
http://www.nea.org/home/17673.htm (last visited Apr. 16, 2019).
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The outcome of the litigation in which these parties are involved is determined
by the court that hears the case. There is currently a circuit split in the federal court
system among three primary tests that are used by federal courts to determine whether
or not the LRE mandate has been met in a given case.11 The Fourth, Sixth, and Eighth
Circuits apply a one-factor test where courts weigh the benefits of a segregated
learning environment with the feasibility of providing the same services provided in
the segregated environment in a regular educational setting.12 The Third, Fifth, and
Tenth Circuits use a test introduced in the case of Daniel R.R. v. Board of
Education.13 The test has two prongs, the first being an assessment of whether a
school can use additional aids and services to create an appropriate public education
in a regular classroom for a child with special educational needs.14 This prong
involves the consideration of a variety of factors including the process utilized by the
school district to create the educational environment and the educational benefit the
plan provides for the child.15 The second prong applies when an educational benefit
in the regular classroom is not possible and asks if the student has been mainstreamed
to the extent possible.16 Finally, the Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits use a test that
incorporates the Daniel R.R. test but adds an additional factor in the first step.17 This
test also explicitly considers the costs to the school district of providing special
education services in a given case.18
It is also important to recognize that the LRE mandate is a mere portion of the
complex IDEA regulatory scheme. The legal issues and questions surrounding the
LRE mandate are closely related and often intertwined with those of other provisions
of the statute. While the Supreme Court has not addressed a proper test or standard
for assessing the LRE mandate, it has addressed another key area of IDEA. In the
recent 2017 case Endrew F. v. Douglas County School District, the Court clarified
the standard to be used when assessing another key provision: a free and appropriate
public education.19 That standard and the language of the Court’s opinion in Endrew
are helpful tools for assessing the effectiveness of LRE judicial tests. It is also helpful
for establishing the general expectations of the Supreme Court in educational cases.
All of these factors demand a judicial standard that addresses the concerns of the
stakeholders and the realities of the logistics and costs of modern education, while
also reflecting Supreme Court precedent on IDEA. This Note argues that such a
standard exists in the Ninth Circuit’s existing LRE test.20 In Part I, this Note will
explore the history of IDEA and identify the purposes behind the law. Part II will
11 See generally Ian Farrell & Chelsea Marx, Fallacy of the Choice: The Destructive Effect of School
Vouchers on Children with Disabilities, 67 AM. U. L. REV. 1797, 1828-30 (2018).
12 See Roncker v. Walter, 700 F.2d 1058, 1063 (6th Cir. 1983).
13 Daniel R.R. v. Bd. of Educ., 874 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1989).
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 See Greer v. Rome City Sch. Dist., 950 F.2d 688, 697 (11th Cir. 1991); Sacramento City Unified Sch.
Dist., Bd. of Educ. v. Holland ex rel. Rachel H., 14 F.3d 1398 (9th Cir. 1994).
19 Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988 (2017).
20 See Sacramento City Unified Sch. Dist., Bd. of Educ. v. Holland ex rel. Rachel H., 14 F.3d at 1400–
01..
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review key litigation concerning IDEA, especially the Supreme Court’s Endrew
decision, and identify the relevant stakeholders and their interests. Part III will
analyze the statutory text and regulations of the LRE mandate. It will also examine
the scholarly landscape of the LRE requirement and crystalize the interests of IDEA
stakeholders as they pertain directly to the LRE mandate. This Part will assess the
Supreme Court’s approach to IDEA generally and specifically in the case of Endrew
to establish guiding principles for analyzing LRE tests. Using these assessments,
Part III will present an evaluative framework to analyze judicial standards for the
LRE mandate. Part IV will provide a detailed introduction of the three primary LRE
judicial tests used in the federal circuit split. Part V will then analyze the tests using
the evaluative framework from Part III to determine which one best meets the
purposes of IDEA presented in the legislative history and case law, as well as the
concerns of the key stakeholders. Part VI will then examine the status of Congress
reauthorizing IDEA and make a recommendation on appropriate Congressional
action to help mitigate litigation regarding the statute.
I.

INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT

This section will introduce IDEA and explore its history and purpose. It will also
identify the key elements of the statute. In particular, the elements will be examined
as to how they apply requirements to the school districts and grant rights to parents
and children.
A. HISTORY AND LEGISLATIVE PURPOSE
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act was an update to the Education
for All Handicapped Children Act which was passed in the context of the federal
government’s increasing involvement in regulating education during the second half
of the twentieth century. Beginning in the 1950s, the federal government began
implementing laws to create and improve services for children with special
educational needs. This process began with the Training of Professional Personnel
Act of 195921 which provided for the training of educators to specialize in working
with children with special needs. This progression included the Captioned Films Act
of 195822 to provide films accessible to students with deafness and hearing
difficulties as well as grants to states to fund the education of children with special
needs. The increasing level of federal involvement in special education culminated
in the passage of EHA in 1975.23 EHA had four stated purposes and six substantive
elements that are all central to IDEA and form the bedrock of federal special
education law.
The four purposes of EHA animate the federal special education statutory
scheme and provide policy makers and courts with a sense of the mission of special
education in the federal context. The first purpose established in the law is “to assure
21 Training of Professional Personnel Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-158,73 Stat. 339.
22 Captioned Films Acts of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-905,72 Stat. 1742.
23 OFF. OF SPECIAL EDUC. & REHAB. SERVS., supra note 2 (stating the purposes outlined in the Education
for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. 94-142).
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that all children with disabilities have available to them … a free appropriate public
education which emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet
their unique needs.”24 The second purpose is “to assure that the rights of children
with disabilities and their parents … are protected.”25 The third purpose is “to assist
States and localities to provide for the education of all children with disabilities.”26
Finally, the fourth purpose is “to assess and assure the effectiveness of efforts to
educate all children with disabilities.”27
These purposes illustrate the contours of special education law and policy in the
United States. Through the language Congress passed and President Ford signed, the
federal government recognizes a right to a “free and appropriate public education”
for children with disabilities.28 These purposes also show that the government has a
clear interest in simultaneously protecting the aforementioned right and working with
school districts to ensure that states, local governments, and school administrations
have the resources necessary to provide appropriate special education services.
Additionally, these purposes notably implicate all of the primary stakeholders—
parents and children, schools, and professionals—while also placing a special
emphasis on evaluating the efficacy of special education programs for individual
children.
The purposes behind EHA remained significant when they guided a series of
amendments to, and reauthorizations of, the law. One such amendment in 1990
changed its name to IDEA.29 IDEA made a few additions to EHA by adding
provisions for helping to transition students with special educational needs from high
school to adult life.30 Further amendments in 1997 strengthened the requirements for
transition planning and the reporting requirements from the school to parents.31 Next,
parts of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 200432
aimed to reemphasize student outcomes over administrative procedures, in an attempt
to match aims with the No Child Left Behind Act of 200133—which was the most
significant piece of education legislation before this reauthorization.34 Each iteration
of this area of law is plagued by a similar problem: proper funding for special
education programs. For a significant portion of the law’s history, federal
appropriations failed to cover even 10% of the excess costs that resulted from the
requirements and mandates of the law.35
24 Id. (quoting the four purposes of Pub. L. 94-142).
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Id. (discussing the implications of Pub. L. 94-142).
29 Id. (discussing 1990 reauthorization).
30 Id.
31 Id. (discussing 1997 amendments).
32 Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004, Pub. L. 108–446, 118 Stat. 2647
(codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. 1400 et. seq. (2004)).
33 No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425.
34 U.S. DEP’T EDUC., IDEA-REAUTHORIZED STATUTE – ALIGNMENT WITH THE NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND
ACT, HTTPS://WWW2.ED.GOV/POLICY/SPECED/GUID/IDEA/TB-NCLB-ALIGN.PDF
(discussing aligning IDEA with the requirements of No Child Left Behind).
35 Kelly, supra note 4, at 26.
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This legislative and amendatory history demonstrates that IDEA evolved over
the decades in an attempt to meet changes in a complicated educational environment.
These changes have occurred while trying to satisfy the key stakeholders and their
sometimes inherently contradictory interests. It is clear that school districts will—in
many cases—have cost concerns while working broadly on special education
programming and budgeting. Concerns about costs run opposite to parents and
teachers, who would understandably hope that a student’s experience and growth
potential is not limited by a federal, state, or local budget line item. The fact that
funding has been a recurring problem throughout the history of the law further
highlights that costs are a central concern. Given that this concern is so central, with
a long history and direct connections to key stakeholders, funding should play a role
in the identification of effective judicial standards for key provisions of the law.
B. PRIMARY ELEMENTS/PRINCIPLES OF IDEA
1. REQUIREMENTS OF THE SCHOOL DISTRICT
Of the six primary elements of IDEA, the free appropriate public education
requirement is at the heart of the law and provides the “what” in terms of what IDEA
tries to accomplish. FAPE establishes that special education is to be provided to
students at no cost to the parents and sets a legal standard of “appropriateness” for
the education provided to the student.36 The statute explicitly defines FAPE as being
provided at public expense under state supervision, meeting the educational standards
of the state involved, matching roughly the levels of traditional education, and
matching the goals and requirements of the IEP prepared for the student.37 The FAPE
element has been subject to much litigation as school districts and courts have
struggled to parse out what constitutes a free and appropriate public education. The
two most prominent cases in this area will be explored later in this Note.38
An individualized education program is the tool through which a FAPE and
special education is documented and ultimately administered: it provides the “how”
of IDEA’s mission. The statute defines it as a “written statement for each child with
a disability that is developed, reviewed, and revised in accordance with section
1414(d) of this title.”39 Section 1414(d) of IDEA lays out the substance and process
requirements for the development of an IEP. The substantive requirements state that
IEPs must identify measurable goals and details of services being provided to the
student and provide explanations of the degree to which a student will not be included
in regular classroom activities.40 The process requirements state that IEPs be
prepared annually by a team that includes special education professionals and the
parents of the child.41
36 Id. at 27–28.
37 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9) (2012) (defining “free appropriate public education” in the definitions section of
the statute).
38 Infra Part II.
39 20 U.S.C. § 1401(14) (2012).
40 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A) (2012).
41 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(B) (2012).
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The least restrictive environment mandate is an additional key element of IDEA,
providing the “where” or logistical realization of IDEA’s mission, which is also the
focus of this Note. The statute provides that in order to meet the LRE mandate, a
school district must ensure that a child with a disability is educated with his or her
peers to the “maximum extent appropriate” through the providing of supplemental
services.42 This provision establishes a preference that children be “mainstreamed.”43
As will be analyzed later in this Note, the parameters of this requirement has been
subject to different legal tests and remains an open legal question nationally.44
The last element that addresses the obligations of the school district under IDEA
is the requirement that a proper evaluation be done for each child in order to
determine appropriate services.45 The statute provides that a parent’s request or
consent is generally required for initial evaluation.46 There are additional
requirements that evaluators be trained in the area of special education services and
that school districts use a “variety of assessment tools and strategies to gather relevant
functional, developmental, and academic information, including information
provided by the parent” to conduct the evaluation.47
2. RIGHTS OF THE PARENTS AND CHILD
The fifth key element of IDEA, and the first relating to the rights of parents and
children, is the requirement that both teachers and parents participate in the planning
and execution of a special education program. This requirement is expansive and
removes the unilateral decision-making power from the school that it may have in
other areas. Parents (and, when feasible, the students themselves) are to be included
on the teams that prepare IEPs and determine placements for the student.
Additionally, as mentioned above, parental request or consent is required to begin the
process of evaluating a child for special education services unless the school district
pursues a separate process.48 Parents also have responsibilities to communicate to
the school district when they are considering removing a student49 or pursuing
recourse against the school district.50 Overall, this element of IDEA with its various
rights and responsibilities for parents demonstrates that IDEA is built around
consensus decision-making.51 This notion of consensus is an important consideration
when assessing legal tests as unlike many other statutory schemes, IDEA provides
for the active participation of those affected in specific cases.
Parents’ procedural safeguards are the final key element of IDEA. This provision
requires that parents be annually notified of their procedural rights under IDEA.52
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52

20 U.S.C. §1412(a)(5) (2012).
Porto, supra note 6, at § 4.7.
See infra Part IV (recognizing the most significant standards of a circuit split).
20 U.S.C. §1414(a)(1)(A) (2012).
20 U.S.C. §1414(a)(1)(D) (2012).
20 U.S.C. §1414(b)(2)(A) (2012).
20 U.S.C. §1414(a)(1)(D).
20 U.S.C. §1412(a)(10)(C)(iii) (2012).
20 U.S.C. §1415(b)(7) (2012).
Kelly, supra note 4, at 34.
20 U.S.C §1415(d)(1)(A) (2012).
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These rights include: the right to an alternative evaluation,53 access to educational
records,54 the ability to present and work through due process complaints through
hearings and mediation,55 and the right to bring civil action in court.56 These specific
procedural rights reinforce the notion that IDEA is focused on a collaborative process
and that parents and children have firm procedural and substantive rights related to
the development and implementation of special education programs.
This brief survey of the key elements and provisions of IDEA illustrate the
statute’s many different parts and their different standards and requirements. This
mosaic of provisions does have some key unifying characteristics. First, they are
centered on a core goal of providing a child an opportunity to learn and develop in
spite of a disability. Second, IDEA implements a consensus driven process that
requires regular interaction between the school district and parents in a decisionmaking capacity. Finally, it is important to recognize these elements are not
necessarily clear and distinct—they interact to achieve IDEA’s goals. Thus,
litigation and commentary on one component of IDEA will have a great impact on
the understanding of another.
II. LITIGATION CONCERNING IDEA
A. CASELAW
A significant portion of the case law involving IDEA has unsurprisingly focused
on the free appropriate public education requirement. While not directly addressing
the least restrictive environment mandate, these cases provide an important context
for understanding the LRE cases. In particular, they help identify what courts
consider to be the key standards and tests to apply when there is litigation over special
education programs. This subsection will address two key Supreme Court cases that
deal with the standard for assessing the FAPE requirement.
1. ROWLEY (1982)
The first case where the Supreme Court ruled on a provision of IDEA (then the
EHA) was Board of Education of the Hendrick Hudson Central School District v.
Rowley in 1982.57 The issue in the case was the determination of what constitutes a
FAPE. The case involved Amy Rowley, a young student in New York with a hearing
impairment. Rowley’s IEP provided for the use of a hearing aide, with which she
was able to perform well in her normal classroom setting. However, Rowley’s
parents believed that with an American Sign Language (ASL) interpreter, she would
be able to perform much better. They provided test results of her academic
performance with and without an interpreter to demonstrate how much better she
performed with an interpreter. The Rowley family sued claiming that a FAPE for
53
54
55
56
57

20 U.S.C. §1415(d)(2)(A) (2012).
20 U.S.C. §1415(d)(2)(D) (2012).
20 U.S.C. §1415(d)(2)(E) (2012).
20 U.S.C. §1415(d)(2)(K) (2012).
Bd. of Educ. Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982).
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their daughter would include the provision of an ASL interpreter.58 The district court
and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals determined that without an interpreter,
Rowley was not receiving a FAPE. Specifically, the Second Circuit defined FAPE
as “an opportunity to achieve [her] full potential commensurate with the opportunity
provided to other children.”59
Writing for a 6-3 majority, then-Justice William Rehnquist reversed the
judgment of the lower courts. The opinion laid out a different standard for
determining a FAPE. The opinion stated that FAPE means that a student gains and
benefits from the services provided. It rejected the idea that FAPE means the
realization of full student potential.60 Applying that standard to the case, the Court
determined that, since Rowley was advancing normally through her education, she
was clearly receiving an educational benefit from her IEP. Thus, under IDEA, the
FAPE requirement had been met and the school district was not required to provide
her with an ASL interpreter to meet its obligations under the Act.61
This standard for FAPE and the Court’s opinion demonstrated two key points
about the statute. First, the focus of IDEA is on a benefit to the student, but not a
maximization of a student’s learning experience. Second, the opinion implicitly
recognizes the burden placed on school districts by IDEA and explicitly releases them
from having to provide every potential resource in order to fulfill the FAPE
requirement.
2. ENDREW (2017)
The Rowley standard for FAPE persisted for three more decades. However, it
left open a question of degrees and how to distinguish the different types of benefits
students could receive under a FAPE.62 The Supreme Court responded to this
question in 2017 with the case Endrew F. v. Douglas County School District. In
Endrew, the petitioner was a student with autism whose parents placed him in a
private school and applied for reimbursement per their rights under IDEA. The
parents argued that the school district had not provided a FAPE for their son and thus
they were entitled to reimbursement under IDEA. The school district argued that it
had provided a FAPE and fulfilled its IDEA requirements.63 The Tenth Circuit Court
of Appeals ruled in favor of the school district, holding that so long as a “de minimis”
benefit was provided by the IEP then the school district met the FAPE requirement
and that the school district had done so in this instance.64
Chief Justice John Roberts wrote a unanimous opinion for the Court. The

58 Id. at 184–86 (1982).
59 Id. at 185–86 (citing Rowley v. Bd. of Educ. Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist., 483 F.Supp. 528, 534
(1980)).
60 Id. at 203–04.
61 Id. at 209–10.
62 This question was demonstrated by the dissent in Rowley itself. See id. at 214 (White, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the legislative history of IDEA establishes a FAPE standard of providing children with “an education opportunity commensurate with that given other children.”).
63 Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988, 996–97 (2017).
64 Id. at 997–98.
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opinion stated that the appropriate standard for assessing a FAPE is that the IEP is
“reasonably calculated to enable a child to make progress appropriate in light of the
child's circumstances.”65 The Court made clear that this progress metric is fact
intensive and is also a balance between the Tenth Circuit’s de minimis interpretation
and the more expansive interpretation argued for by the parents.66
The primary takeaway of Endrew is that the educational benefit necessary for a
FAPE must include an element of progress. This notion of educational progress is
important to recognize for the other elements of IDEA, as the Supreme Court makes
clear it is the test for one of the core aspects of the statute.
The Supreme Court in both Rowley and Endrew demonstrated two key concerns
for IDEA cases and general interpretation of the statute. First, they made clear that
the purpose of the statute is to promote educational benefits for students with
disabilities and specifically benefits with an element of progress. Second, the
Supreme Court recognized that the requirements of IDEA do not amount to a
guarantee of proficiency or growth. Inherent in that recognition is a concern that
school districts cannot provide every possible resource to students. This concern
implicitly acknowledges cost limitations—both financial and human—on what
school districts can provide for students with disabilities. So, the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence on IDEA presents the dual, and sometimes conflicting, concerns of
progress and cost to consider when resolving cases dealing with provisions of the
statute.
B. KEY STAKEHOLDERS IN IDEA LITIGATION
For the purposes of analyzing judicial standards for provisions of IDEA, an
important first step is to identify the key stakeholders in litigation regarding the
provisions. The FAPE cases are the primary Supreme Court precedents on IDEA
and allow for a clear identification of the key stakeholders both at the national and
local level. The primary stakeholders whose interests are relevant to the analysis of
a workable standard for the LRE mandate are, first and foremost, students and
parents. Secondly, school districts have a strong interest in a workable LRE standard.
Finally, teachers and school professionals have a clear, vested interest in the
standards applied to IDEA provisions and will be analyzed briefly here.
1. STUDENTS AND PARENTS
The first stakeholders in IDEA litigation are obviously the students with
disabilities and their parents. IDEA was devised as a legislative solution to
discrimination against, and isolation of, students with disabilities.67 Accordingly,
these students and their primary advocates—their parents—have strong interests in
65 Id. at 999.
66 Id. at 1001 (holding that the standard the parents argue for, “an education that aims to provide a child
with a disability opportunities to achieve academic success, attain self-sufficiency, and contribute to society
that are substantially equal to the opportunities afforded children without disabilities,” is inconsistent with the
holding of Rowley).
67 Stafford, supra note 5, at 72.
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legal standards. A broad condition of IDEA is that, in order for a state to receive
federal funding for special education programs, the state must establish a “goal of
providing full educational opportunity to all children with disabilities.”68 This high
goal guides the interests of the parents and students. This is particularly illustrated
in arguments of the parents in Endrew, where they called for the definition of FAPE
to be “an education that seeks to provide children with disabilities with substantially
equal opportunities to achieve academic success, attain self-sufficiency, and
contribute to society.”69 This interest in broad educational opportunities for a child
with disabilities is clear in this single case involving a student with autism. However,
it also belies the general overarching concern about such opportunities in a variety of
contexts. This is best represented by the briefs in Endrew supporting the arguments
of the parents. They make clear that judicial tests should comport with the purpose
of IDEA and that demanding standards are called for by the statute.70 There is also
a call for as much specificity as possible in the legal standard given the gravity of the
decisions that must be made for students with disabilities. Advocates for Children
of New York and other organizations argued that specific standards are necessary for
parents to plan and advocate for their children effectively.71 So, in sum, parents and
students are key stakeholders and have a clear interest in specific standards when it
comes to the provisions of IDEA.

2. STATES AND THEIR SCHOOL DISTRICTS
The Douglas County School District, as the respondent in Endrew, represented
the parents’ natural opposition. States and their respective school districts have a
series of mandates they must meet in order to receive federal funding for their special
education programs. There is a natural assumption that since states and school
districts provide education to thousands of students, they will be reticent about strict
and demanding legal standards for the provisions of IDEA. Indeed, the briefs in
Endrew make clear that this is their key interest in the determination of IDEA
standards. The brief for the school district argued for the de minimis standard for
FAPE and that IDEA’s text, purpose, and history supported this standard since
Congress was not explicit in setting high standards.72 Additionally, amicus briefs for
the school district argued that courts should stay out of the complex decision making
of developing special education programs and allow greater deference to the states

68 See 20 U.S.C. §1412(a)(2) (2012) (establishing the “full educational opportunity goal” of IDEA).
69 Brief for Petitioner at 40, Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988
(2017) (No. 15-827), 2016 WL 6769009, at *40.
70 See generally Brief for Nat’l Disability Rights Network, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner,
Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988 (2016) (No. 15-827), 2016 WL
6916164.
71 Brief for Advocates for Children of N.Y., et. al. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Endrew F.
ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988 (2017) (No. 15-827), 2016 WL 6892531, at
*23–24.
72 Brief for Respondent, Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988
(2017) (No. 15-827), 2016 WL 7321785, at *37.
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and school districts.73 Specifically, the organizations of school management
professionals argued that Congress, and not the courts, is the best actor to define
standards for IDEA since Congress authored it, and the statute exists in a greater
context of federal education funding.74 Overall, school districts have a clear interest
in IDEA standards that are limited, and give deference to the school district in how
they make decisions and allocate resources.
3. SPECIAL EDUCATION TEACHERS
The final key stakeholder in IDEA litigation is separate from the immediatelyclear adversarial parties in IDEA litigation. However, it is implicit given the structure
of IDEA’s requirements that the teachers will form a separate stakeholder group.
While their professional obligations will orient them to maximizing student
outcomes, the realities of working in education will make teachers sensitive to the
funding and human demands of applying the law. The text of IDEA itself identifies
teachers by establishing that IEP teams include teachers and specialists.75 IEP teams
include a distinct class of special educational professionals who for all intents and
purposes are responsible for executing the goals of not only IDEA but also the
established state and local education policies and goals. Since a significant portion
of school districts have unionized teachers,76 there is a centralized space for these
professionals to articulate their interests in IDEA litigation. The NEA’s brief in
Endrew made clear that teachers consider it their professional and moral duty to
ensure students with disabilities have educational opportunities and that those
opportunities exceed de minimis standard at issue in the case.77 Additionally, the
NEA has identified a number of policy goals related to IDEA with a clear focus on
the full funding of special education.78 Special education teachers, with their unique
role in executing the provisions of IDEA, have stated concerns regarding ensuring
student progress but also securing funding and recognizing the limitations of
financial resources. When compared to other stakeholders, this balanced approach
has a moderating and pragmatic influence in discussions surrounding IDEA
provisions.
In combination, these three interests of key stakeholders provide three of the
necessary prongs to evaluate IDEA mandates and specific LRE judicial standards.
73 See Brief of Amici Curiae Colo. State. Bd. of Educ. & Colo. Dep’t of Educ. Supporting Respondent,
Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988 (2017) (No. 15-827), 2016 WL
7450495 at *14 (arguing that IDEA is part of a greater educational funding statutory landscape and requires
unambiguous standards and defers implementation to the States).
74 Brief of AASA, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas
Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988 (2017) (No. 15-827), 2016 WL 7450494, at *7–14.
75 20 U.S.C. §1414(d)(1)(B) (2012) (statutory section identifying the requirements of an IEP team).
76 Union Affiliation of Employed Wage and Salary Workers by Occupation and Industry, BUREAU LABOR
STAT., https://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.t03.htm (last modified Jan. 19, 2018) (table detailing the unionization rates of various professions, “education, training, and library occupations” had a union representation
rate of 38.2%).
77 Brief Amicus Curiae of Nat’l Educ. Ass’n. Supporting Petitioner, Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988 (2017) (No. 15-827), 2016 WL 6916168, at *3–4.
78 NAT’L EDUC. ASS’N, supra note 10 (background section discussing the NEA’s top priority related to
IDEA being fully funded special education programs).
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LEAST RESTRICTIVE ENVIRONMENT MANDATE TEXT AND
EVALUATIVE FRAMEWORK

IDEA has multiple key provisions that are bound by the statute’s purpose of
opening educational opportunities to students with disabilities. With the FAPE at the
core, the other key provisions fit together as a mosaic of statutory mandates. Within
this mosaic, the LRE mandate looms large. As addressed in the introductory material
of this Note, the LRE mandate answers the all-important “where” of a special
educational program. It is a logistical concept that involves spatial and staffing
decision making and has a direct impact on a student’s educational opportunities.79
The significance of LRE within the greater framework of IDEA calls for a workable
judicial standard, as has been provided for the FAPE requirement.
In order to evaluate and establish a workable standard for the LRE, a brief
analysis of the statute itself and related case law is necessary. From there, an analysis
of the scholarship on the LRE mandate and an assessment of the interests of the key
stakeholders in IDEA litigation can be utilized to build a framework for evaluation
of judicial standards for LRE. Additionally, because of the interconnectivity of IDEA
provisions, and the fact that FAPE—but not LRE—has been directly litigated before
the Supreme Court, the holding of Endrew can be used to help assess judicial
standards as well. Together, this analysis provides an evaluative framework for
judicial standards for LRE.
A. STATUTORY TEXT
The section of IDEA that articulates the language behind the LRE mandate reads:
(A) In general
To the maximum extent appropriate, children with disabilities,
including children in public or private institutions or other care
facilities, are educated with children who are not disabled, and
special classes, separate schooling, or other removal of
children with disabilities from the regular educational
environment occurs only when the nature or severity of the
disability of a child is such that education in regular classes
with the use of supplementary aids and services cannot be
achieved satisfactorily.
(B) Additional requirement
(i) In general
A State funding mechanism shall not result in placements
that violate the requirements of subparagraph (A), and a
State shall not use a funding mechanism by which the State
79 See supra Part I.B.1 (the six requirements of IDEA).
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distributes funds on the basis of the type of setting in which
a child is served that will result in the failure to provide a
child with a disability a free appropriate public education
according to the unique needs of the child as described in
the child's IEP.
(ii) Assurance
If the State does not have policies and procedures to ensure
compliance with clause (i), the State shall provide the
Secretary an assurance that it will revise the funding
mechanism as soon as feasible to ensure that such
mechanism does not result in such placements.80
This text establishes three core components of the LRE that are also spelled out
in the federal regulations for IDEA.81 First, students with special educational needs
are to be educated with their peers to the extent possible.82 The LRE mandate is
generally read as requiring “mainstreaming” of students with special educational
needs.83 Second, there is an acknowledgement by the use of the term “satisfactorily”
that there is a line for when students mainstreaming can be set aside in favor of a
segregated learning environment.84 Third, funding plans and limitations are
specifically barred from creating a situation where a student is educated in an
environment that does not meet the goals of mainstreaming.85
The LRE has been addressed in a variety of litigation in federal district and
circuit courts over the last four decades. In these cases, the courts have broadly
emphasized the need for mainstreaming students with disabilities while also
recognizing IDEA requires individualized education plans and accommodations as
manifested by the IEP requirement.86 School districts have had difficulty balancing
mainstreaming and individualized education, and this is where litigation has often
occurred.87 The point of diversion between the federal courts on the issue of
assessing the LRE requirement is what factors to consider when evaluating specific
cases.88 Thus, there is no national judicial standard for applying the LRE mandate
due to a circuit split on what the most important factors are in considering whether
or not a learning environment is in fact the “least restrictive.”

80 20 U.S.C. §1412(a)(5) (2012).
81 34 C.F.R. §300.114 (2006).
82 20 U.S.C. §1412(a)(5)(A) (2012).
83 Stacey Gordon, Making Sense of the Inclusion Debate Under IDEA, 2006 BYU EDUC. & L. J. 189,
198 (2006).
84 §1412(a)(5)(A).
85 20 U.S.C. §1412(a)(5)(B)(i) (2012).
86 See infra Part IV (discussing and identifying key LRE case law).
87 Porto, supra note 6, at §2[a].
88 Farrell & Marx, supra note 11, at 1828–30.
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B. CONTEMPORARY SCHOLARSHIP
As with other aspects of IDEA, the LRE mandate is a common subject of legal
scholarship by both law students and legal and educational academics. Using the
2004 reauthorization of IDEA as a starting point, there has been extensive scholarship
addressing the fundamental ideas behind the LRE mandate and trying to develop a
national LRE standard. Shortly following the 2004 reauthorization, Ruth Colker
argued against a rigid integration presumption. Instead, she advocated for the
inclusion of additional factors (which are open for debate) in determining
placements.89
This article offered a challenge to the foundation of the
mainstreaming/integration presumption and advocated for a more thoughtful analysis
of what constitutes the “least restrictive environment.”
Colker’s article prompted responses that favored maintaining the integration
presumption. Samuel Bagenstos argued that there is a risk in abandoning the
integration presumption that children may be inappropriately driven back into
segregated placements.90 Marc Weber’s response argued the integration presumption
should be kept in place but applied in a nuanced manner. Specifically, he
recommended that when parents resist integrated settings, the presumption be given
less strength, but when school districts resist integration, the presumption be applied
strongly and the decisions of the school districts closely scrutinized.91 These two
responses along with Colker’s article demonstrate the scholarly debate surrounding
the integration presumption that continues decades after the passage of IDEA.
Other authors have also argued for rethinking the integration presumption at the
heart of the LRE mandate. Taking a similar approach to Colker, Bonnie Spiro
Schinagle and Marilyn J. Bartlett made the case that in the wake of the initial passage
of IDEA, integration of students with special education needs into regular classrooms
was a primary goal due to their prior isolation.92 However, the authors argued that
in the decades since IDEA was passed, inclusion is no longer as critical a concern as
society and educational opportunities and services have changed. Rather, in their
view, the LRE mandate should be applied in a “truly individualized” manner, with a
rejection of an automatic presumption for mainstreaming.93 This argument goes to
the heart of the LRE mandate and calls for a rethinking of its rationale and
application.
Similarly, Mark T. Keaney argued that teacher interests should be accounted for
in a reconceptualization of the debate about integrating special and general education
students. The argument rests on the idea that teachers—when given adequate
resources, options, and input on the feasibility of placements—will be able to

89 Ruth Colker, The Disability Integration Presumption: Thirty Years Later, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 789
(2006).
90 Samuel R. Bagenstos, Response, Abolish the Integration Presumption? Not Yet, 156 U. PA. L. REV.
ONLINE 157 (2007), https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/penn_law_review_online/vol156/iss1/4/.
91 Mark C. Weber, Response, A Nuanced Approach to the Disability Integration Presumption, 156 U.
PA. L. REV. ONLINE 174 (2007), https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/penn_law_review_online/vol156/iss1/6/.
92 Bonnie Spiro Schinagle & Marilyn J. Bartlett, The Strained Dynamic of the Least Restrictive Environment Concept in the IDEA, 35 CHILD. LEGAL RTS. J. 229 (2015).
93 Id. at 249.
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implement plans to the benefit of all.94 This argument also calls for a reevaluation of
the mainstreaming presumption and specifically calls for an expansion of the
considerations included in applying the LRE mandate.
Other scholarship has sought to evaluate the existing LRE judicial standards and
determine which judicial standard best fulfills the purposes of IDEA.95 While the
scholarship reaches different conclusions, it illustrates an academic desire to clarify
the LRE mandate. The scholarship also collectively seeks to establish real guidance
for parents, children, teachers, and school districts as they navigate the IEP process.
In sum, both the questioning of the foundations of the LRE mandate and the search
for a workable judicial standard demonstrate that the LRE mandate is ripe for both
judicial and legislative reevaluation.
C. IDEA Stakeholder Interests in LRE Cases
When assessing potential national judicial standards for the LRE requirement, it
is important to include the interests of key stakeholders in the broader IDEA statute
in any analysis used. Given that LRE cases exist in the educational legal space, there
is a defined pool of litigants and directly affected parties that should be examined.
Falling into the broader category of IDEA litigation, the key parties that are typically
involved in LRE cases are the same as those that are involved in the FAPE cases:
parents and children, school districts, and special education professionals. The
central question for all of these parties is to what degree should a child with special
educational needs be mainstreamed. This Section briefly identifies party specific
interests relating to the LRE mandate to build prongs of an evaluative framework for
an LRE judicial standard.
1. PARENTS AND CHILDREN WITH SPECIAL EDUCATIONAL NEEDS
Parents and their children who have special educational needs have a natural
interest in an LRE standard that allows the child to be placed in a regular classroom
and gives them educational and social growth opportunities available to other
children. However, in the complex world of special education, there is a recognition
that the decision of what classroom to educate a child in requires more thought than
merely pushing a student into a regular classroom. Specifically, the Federation for
Children with Special Needs (“FCSN”) advises parents to ensure that LRE decisions
are made “individually and carefully.”96 The FCSN also addresses that an LRE is

94 Mark T. Keaney, Comment, Examining Teacher Attitudes Toward Integration: Important Considerations for Legislatures, Courts, and Schools, 56 ST. LOUIS L.J. 827 (2012).
95 See, e.g., Adam B. Diaz, Note, How the Mainstreaming Presumption Became the Inclusion Mandate,
40 J. LEGIS. 220 (2013–14) (arguing for a test that uses the second prong of the Fifth Circuit Daniel R.R. test
but using the factors developed in the Ninth Circuit Rachel H. case); Sarah Prager, Note, An "IDEA" to Consider: Adopting a Uniform Test to Evaluate Compliance with the IDEA's Least Restrictive Environment Mandate, 59 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 653 (2014) (advocating for the Fifth Circuit Daniel R.R. test); Megan McGovern,
Note, Least Restrictive Environment: Fulfilling the Promises of IDEA, 21 WIDENER L. REV. 117 (2015) (arguing for a test resembling the Fifth Circuit Daniel R.R. test).
96 What is Available by Law, FED’N FOR CHILD. WITH SPECIAL NEEDS, https://fcsn.org/sepo/law/ (last
visited Jan. 23, 2019).
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based on the educational needs of a child, not the limitations or accommodations of
his or her disability.97 This guidance to parents demonstrates a strong interest in
mainstreaming that, while significant, is tempered by a desire for their children to be
educated in an environment in which they can succeed educationally.
A specific illustration of a potential reason parents may not want their children
mainstreamed is the risk of bullying faced by children with disabilities. In a 2018
study, it was found that children with autism spectrum disorder (“ASD”) in regular
classrooms were 6.5 times more likely to have been bullied than those in special
placements. This was in part due to social skill deficits and difficulties with
emotional reactivity.98 While in many ways obvious, the interest of parents and
children to have an educational setting that will promote growth is critical for the
establishment of an effective LRE judicial standard. In fact, given the purpose and
history of the statute, the needs of the students to have an LRE established for their
educational needs should be the primary factor in establishing a judicial standard.
2. SCHOOL DISTRICTS
School districts have a clear and strong interest in compliance with IDEA, and
thus with ensuring students are placed in regular classrooms to the extent possible.
The public statements and policies of school districts generally reflect this desire and
aspiration for compliance.99 However, in the LRE space, school districts have an
inherent issue of also recognizing the educational needs of other students. The
potential for classroom disruption when children with special education needs are
placed in regular classrooms does exist.100 School districts also have an obligation
to parents and children without special educational needs,101 which is generally
recognized publicly with an inclusive, if generic, mission statement.102
Thus, the interests of school districts include a consideration of the impact
placements have on the general education classroom at large. This should not be the
primary consideration in evaluating LRE judicial standards because of school
district’s desire to comply with IDEA. However, in the broader scope of education,
it is an important issue to be included as an additional concern so that implementation

97 Id.
98 Benjamin Zablotsky, Bullying and Mainstreaming in the Schools, AUSTISM SPEAKS (Sept. 28, 2018),
https://www.autismspeaks.org/blog/bullying-and-mainstreaming-schools.
99 See Diverse Learners – Special Education Support Services, CHI. PUB. SCHS., https://cps.edu/diverselearners/Pages/ServicesandPrograms.aspx (last visited Jan. 23, 2019) (“Special classes, separate schooling, or
other placements that remove students from the regular education classroom occur only when specified by a
student's Individualized Education Program (IEP).”).
100 See Christina Samuels, Does Inclusion Slow Down General Education Classrooms?, EDUC. WEEK
(Nov. 3, 2017), http://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/speced/2017/11/does_inclusion_slow_down_general_education.html (discussing an international study that found teachers with no students with disabilities spent roughly
12% more time teaching than those with a classroom including students with special educational needs).
101 See generally Introduction – Our Mission, CHI. PUB. SCHS., https://cps.edu/About_CPS/vision/Pages/mission.aspx (last visited Jan. 23, 2019) (stating the Chicago Public Schools system mission is to
“To provide a high quality public education for every child, in every neighborhood, that prepares each for
success in college, career and civic life.”).
102 See Equity and Excellence, N.Y. DEP’T OF EDUC., https://www.schools.nyc.gov/about-us/vision-andmission/equity-and-excellence (last visited Jan. 23, 2019) (“Every child deserves an excellent education”).
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of LREs does not overwhelm general education classrooms.
3. SPECIAL EDUCATIONAL PROFESSIONALS
The final key stakeholders in LRE cases are special education professionals.
Much like the school district’s legal obligation, these school employees have a
professional obligation to ensure that students are placed in an educational
environment where they can learn and grow. However, as demonstrated by the
statements of the NEA and similar organizations, the fact that IDEA mandates are
not fully funded by the federal government greatly complicates the situation.103
Additionally, there is the reality that in order for IDEA to be executed properly, there
needs to be a trained educational workforce capable of implementing it. A 2012
study found that nearly a quarter of special education teachers in the rural U.S. left
their positions due to issues related to stress and lack of support.104 The inherent
stress of paperwork and coordinating with multiple professionals to plan and
implement IEPs is compounded by a disconnect many special education
professionals experience with regular educational teachers.105 The funding shortfalls,
and difficulties facing special education teachers, warrant including the practical
feasibility of a learning environment for a student with special educational needs
when considering a workable LRE judicial standard.
D. SUPREME COURT GUIDANCE FOR LRE
An additional important factor for an LRE evaluative framework is the guidance
of the Supreme Court. While the Supreme Court has never ruled directly on an LRE
standard, it has given guidance on other parts of IDEA. IDEA is notable in the
educational community for its multiple critical pieces and their complicated
interactions. The intricate interacting pieces of the statute106 can be likened to a
mosaic, and given its challenges, a puzzle.107 Accordingly, when the Supreme Court
gives guidance on one portion of the statute, this advice can reasonably be applied to
the other pieces. The purpose of IDEA, to provide educational access for children
with special educational needs, is only feasible when the different provisions inform
and strengthen each other. The Supreme Court’s standard for the critical FAPE
component in Endrew, that the student’s educational plan must include an element of
progress, is applicable to the LRE requirement. The judicial standard for LREs
should include a consideration of whether the learning environment or the degree of
mainstreaming is suited for a student’s educational progress. Much like the Supreme
Court’s analysis of the FAPE requirement, neither de minimis growth nor a static
educational situation stemming from an LRE will meet the purposes of IDEA.
103 NAT’L EDUC. ASS’N, supra note 10.
104 Christina A. Samuels, Why Special Educators Really Leave the Classroom, EDUC. WEEK (Jan. 24,
2018),
https://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2018/01/24/why-special-educators-really-leave-the-classroom.html.
105 Id.
106 See supra text accompanying note 4.
107 See Allison Zimmer, Solving the IDEA Puzzle: Building a Better Social Education Development
Process Through Endrew F., 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1015, 1019 (Oct. 2018).

316

Journal of Legislation

[Vol. 45:13]

Further, such a situation ignores the explicit guidance of the Supreme Court on a
closely related and essential provision of IDEA. If the LRE is not appropriate for
real educational progress, then the other provisions of IDEA will be complicated, and
the child will likely fall short of educational goals.
E. EVALUATIVE FRAMEWORK
A consideration of the Act’s text, the interests of key stakeholders, and the
guidance from the Supreme Court are all necessary for a workable LRE judicial
standard. Together they comprise a framework that can be used to evaluate existing
LRE judicial tests for their viability as a national standard. The framework is
composed primarily of whether a standard is clearly oriented towards mainstreaming
and ensuring a capacity for educational progress for the student with special
educational needs. This component addresses the mainstreaming language of IDEA
itself, the progress-oriented guidance of the Supreme Court, and the interests of
parents. However, given the importance of other stakeholders in IDEA cases, the
consideration of general feasibility (in terms of both finances and staffing resources)
is included in the framework. This consideration addresses the interests of school
districts and special education professionals, who are essential to the successful
implementation of IDEA. So, in summary, a workable LRE judicial standard will
include elements that are primarily oriented towards the concerns of student progress
and mainstreaming, with a secondary concern of whether or not the LRE in the
specific case is feasible logistically and financially.
IV.

CIRCUIT SPLIT: THE THREE LRE JUDICIAL STANDARDS

There are three prominent LRE judicial standards worth examining using the
evaluative framework constructed in Part III. They are the tests utilized by the
various federal circuit courts when confronted with cases alleging a school district’s
failure to fulfill IDEA’s LRE mandate. This Section will assess their cases of origin
and identify the tests to be considered.
A. RONCKER
The Fourth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits use an LRE test rooted in the 1983 Sixth
Circuit opinion Roncker v. Walter.108 In that case, Neill Roncker was a nine-yearold boy from Ohio who had severe intellectual challenges. In determining an
appropriate placement for Roncker under IDEA, the school district made the
determination to place him in a special county school. The school exclusively served
children with severe intellectual disabilities and challenges. The result was that
Roncker did not have any contact with non-challenged students.109 Roncker’s parents
filed suit claiming that while their son required special educational instruction, it
could be provided in a setting where he was in contact with children who did not have
108 See Roncker v. Walter, 700 F.2d 1058 96th Cir. 1983); N.W. ex rel. A.W. v. Nw. R-1 Sch. Dist., 813
F.2d 158, 163 (8th Cir. 1987); DeVries v. Fairfax Cty. Sch. Bd., 882 F.2d 876, 879 (4th Cir. 1989).
109 Roncker, 700 F.2d at 1060.
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intellectual disabilities, and thus the school district failed to meet the statutory LRE
mandate. The district court found in favor of the school district, finding that IDEA
(then the EHA) gave school districts broad discretion in determining placements for
children with intellectual disabilities. The district court cited Rockner’s lack of
progress while temporarily in a school with children with and without intellectual
disabilities as reason enough for the school district’s decision.110
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit found that the district court’s deference to the school
district was not the appropriate standard for assessing whether a school district has
met the LRE mandate. Rather, the court established a baseline of mainstreaming to
the maximum extent appropriate, per Congressional preference.111 As a standard and
test, the court directed lower courts to determine whether the attributes and services
that make a segregated learning facility superior for a given child can feasibly be
provided in a non-segregated setting. If they can be, then the LRE mandate has not
been met if the student is placed in the segregated facility. The Sixth Circuit
remanded the case for application of this standard.112 This amounts to a one factor
test applicable when directly comparing a regular classroom placement with a
segregated facility considered superior for that child’s needs, wherein the feasibility
of providing the services of a segregated facility in a non-segregated one is the
determinative factor.
B.

DANIEL R.R.

The Third, Fifth, and Tenth Circuits use an LRE judicial standard developed in
the 1989 Fifth Circuit case Daniel R.R. v. Board of Education.113 The case involved
Daniel R., a child with Down syndrome, who had mental and speech impairments.
Daniel’s parents wanted him to receive his education in a regular education classroom
and he was initially placed in such a classroom for part of his pre-Kindergarten school
day. However, shortly after the beginning of his school year, it became clear to the
teacher and school administration that the regular classroom was not a viable option
for Daniel as he required constant individual attention. In order for Daniel to
comprehend the curriculum, it would need to be significantly altered. Thus, the
school district’s special education officials determined that Daniel would be taken
out of a regular classroom setting.114 Daniel’s parents followed the procedural
process to try to get their son back into a regular education classroom. However, the
administrative hearing officers and district court all found for the school district on
the grounds that Daniel was not receiving an educational benefit in the regular
classroom.115
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit upheld the decision of the district court that the
school district had met the LRE mandate for Daniel. The court came to this
110 Id. at 1061.
111 Id. at 1063.
112 Id.
113 See Daniel R.R. v. Bd. of Educ., 874 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1989); Oberti v. Bd. of Educ. of Clementon
Sch. Dist., 995 F.2d 1204, 1215 (3d Cir. 1993); L.B. v. Nebo Sch. Dist., 379 F.3d 966, 977 (10th Cir. 2004).
114 Daniel R.R., 874 F.2d at 1039.
115 Id. at 1040.

318

Journal of Legislation

[Vol. 45:13]

conclusion through the application of a multi-factor test constructed in the wake of
Rowley. The court first considered how the school district took steps to accommodate
the student in a regular education environment, while recognizing that there are limits
to what a school district is required to provide.116 The next two factors considered
were: whether a child would receive an educational benefit in a regular education
environment and a balancing of the benefits of both regular and special education for
the child. The final factor was an assessment of what effect a child with special
educational needs would have on a regular education environment and the learning
of regular education students.117 The court also articulated a second prong using
language from the statute. If a court determines that “education in the regular
classroom cannot be achieved satisfactorily,” the court must look at whether the child
has been mainstreamed to the extent appropriate.118 After considering these factors,
the court concluded that the school district took sufficient steps and made efforts to
accommodate Daniel in the regular education environment by providing
supplementary aides and services. They also determined that he received “little if
any” educational benefit in the regular education classroom and that he was making
some progress in a special education environment. Finally, they held that Daniel’s
presence in a regular classroom was unfair to the rest of the class since the teacher
was required to spend a significant amount of time attending to just one student.119
Thus, the Daniel R.R. test has two prongs. The first prong considers four nonexhaustive factors: (1) the efforts of the school district to mainstream; (2) the
educational benefit; (3) a balancing analysis; and (4) the impact a regular classroom
placement has on the regular education students. The second prong, used when
regular classroom placement is not workable, is whether the child has still been
mainstreamed to the extent possible.
C. RACHEL H.
The Ninth and Eleventh Circuits also use a multi-factor test in assessing a school
district’s application of the LRE mandate that is a slight variation on the Daniel R.R.
test. The test, adding a factor for cost, was first utilized in the Eleventh Circuit,120
but is most clearly articulated in the 1994 Ninth Circuit case Sacramento Unified
School District v. Holland ex. rel. Rachel H.121 In that case, Rachel H., a nine-yearold student with moderate mental disabilities, had an IEP that placed her in a special
education classroom for half the time and a regular education classroom for the other
half. Her parents, seeking greater mainstreaming, requested that she spend more time
in a regular education classroom. The school district declined by saying that Rachel

116 Id. at 1048 (“States need not provide every conceivable supplementary aid or service to assist the
child”).
117 Id. at 1049.
118 Id. at 1050.
119 Daniel R.R., 874 F.2d at 1050–51.
120 See Greer v. Rome City Sch. Dist., 950 F.2d 688, 697 (11th Cir. 1991); See also Sch. Dist. of Wis.
Dells v. Littlegeorge, 295 F.3d 671, 672 (7th Cir. 2002) (acknowledging cost as a factor in evaluating the LRE
mandate).
121 Sacramento City Unified Sch. Dist. v. Rachel H., 14 F.3d 1398, 1400 (9th Cir. 1994).
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H. would not benefit from being in a regular classroom fulltime.122 The
administrative hearing officers and district court found in favor of Rachel H. The
district court applied the following four-factor test to conclude full mainstreaming
was required:
(1) the educational benefits available to Rachel in a regular classroom,
supplemented with appropriate aids and services, as compared with the
educational benefits of a special education classroom; (2) the nonacademic benefits of interaction with children who were not disabled; (3)
the effect of Rachel's presence on the teacher and other children in the
classroom; and (4) the cost of mainstreaming Rachel in a regular
classroom.123
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit determined the four-factor test was appropriate for LRE
cases, with its inclusion of cost as a factor.124 The court recognized its origins in
Daniel R.R. but also followed Greer by adding the cost of mainstreaming as a
consideration available to the courts.125 Further, the court agreed with the district
court’s application of the test and affirmed the ruling in favor of Rachel H. The
district court had found that Rachel received “substantial educational benefits” from
being in a regular education classroom, developed social skills from her placement
with non-disabled children, and was not a distraction in the classroom.126
Additionally, at trial, the school district failed to demonstrate evidence supporting
the idea that mainstreaming Rachel H. was more expensive than the segregated
setting or was otherwise overly financially burdensome for the school district. 127
Thus, the Ninth Circuit established an LRE judicial standard that follows the main
points of the Daniel R.R. standard, but added a clear consideration of costs.
V.

ANALYSIS OF SIGNIFICANT LRE JUDICIAL STANDARDS

In order to determine the viability of the three current primary judicial tests as a
national standard, they need to be analyzed under the evaluative framework
constructed in Part III. This framework considers first elements that are primarily
oriented toward enabling student progress and mainstreaming, an interest of parents
and children primarily but also the other key stakeholders and consistent with
Supreme Court precedent. The evaluative framework then has a secondary
consideration of whether the LRE in the specific case is feasible both logistically and
financially, reflecting the concerns of school districts and special education
professionals.128

122
123
124
125
126
127
128

Id. at 1400.
Id. at 1400–01.
Id. at 1404.
Id. (acknowledging district court’s reliance on Greer, 950 F.2d at 697 (including cost as a factor)).
Rachel H., 14 F.3d at 1401.
Id. at 1401–02.
See discussion supra Part III.E (establishing the evaluative framework).
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A. ANALYSIS OF RONCKER STANDARD
The Roncker standard offers a comparative analysis for LRE cases. It requires
courts to look at features of segregated learning environments and determine if they
can be reasonably incorporated into a regular learning environment. Under the first
prong of the evaluative framework, which requires a focus on progress and
mainstreaming, this standard seems ambiguous. The Roncker standard does not
explicitly state that the environment where advantageous features can work best will
be the best one to provide educational progress. This lack of clarity leaves the test
open to the problem the Supreme Court identified regarding the Rowley FAPE
standard. Namely, the difference between the environments could be negligible, and
in fact the movement of a child between such environments could pose a problem
that impairs educational progress in such a scenario. While these situations are
hypothetical, they demonstrate that the Roncker test does not clearly respond to the
first prong of analysis regarding the strong emphasis on Endrew’s progress language.
The Roncker standard responds more favorably to the second prong of analysis
in that it incorporates feasibility. By inquiring as to the applicability of features of a
segregated learning environment to a regular one, it is giving the school districts a
certain amount of discretion. It gives them the ability to look at their work force and
resources and determine how to practically accommodate the needs of children with
special educational needs. However, it falls short in that it does not explicitly
consider financial costs, an issue that occurs in IDEA litigation. While this vagueness
is not as significant as that in the first prong, it still falls short.
Overall, the Roncker standard is not a workable national standard for LRE
litigation. It is too vague in key points of litigation: the need for real student progress
and the consideration of financial costs. Further, it has limited use and would not
necessarily be applicable to all LRE cases. As has been observed, it is only applicable
if a segregated learning environment is determined to be superior.129 Additionally,
there are cases where the LRE issue centers on services provided (aides, technology,
etc.) rather than the physical classroom space. Under such a standard, the key
stakeholders will be left to struggle with the vagueness, and courts will be forced to
compare two different educational environments, one potentially hypothetical, on a
regular basis.
B. ANALYSIS OF DANIEL R.R. STANDARD
The Daniel R.R. standard offers a more robust test as it evaluates the action of
the school district to achieve mainstreaming, the educational benefits provided to the
students, a balancing of special and regular education, and the impact on the regular
classroom environment. Applying the Part III evaluative framework, the standard
responds favorably to the primary progress and mainstreaming prong of analysis.
Daniel R.R.’s test starts by examining how a given school district attempted to
accomplish mainstreaming the student. The second and third Daniel R.R. factors
focus on a real educational benefit and balance the benefits and detriments of special
and regular education options. These factors respond favorably to the progress
129 Farrell & Marx, supra note 11, at 1830.

Journal of Legislation

321

language of Endrew by bringing educational benefits to the forefront and allowing
flexibility in comparing special and regular education.
In terms of the feasibility prong, the standard fares relatively well. The Daniel
R.R. court’s language recognizing the limits of what school districts could provide is
incorporated into the first factor.130 This provides protection to school districts from
financial and labor crushing accommodations. It also critically acknowledges the
impact of mainstreaming on the regular education classroom. This is an important
feasibility consideration for school districts, both in terms of the capacity of their
teachers and their responsibility to educate general education students.
Overall, the Daniel R.R. standard is viable under the Part III evaluative
framework. The concerns of all the key stakeholders are addressed. First and most
importantly, its focus on mainstreaming and educational benefits addresses the
student progress goal of IDEA that is common to the stakeholders but chief for
children and parents. By balancing the benefits available in different learning
environments, they are giving school districts flexibility in figuring out different
ways to accommodate students.
Finally, by acknowledging the impact
mainstreaming can have on a regular classroom environment, the standard is
addressing the concerns of special education professionals by ensuring that
mainstreaming does not inordinately strain educators or come at the expense of their
professional responsibility to regular education students.
C. ANALYSIS OF RACHEL H. STANDARD
Derived from the Daniel R.R. standard, the Rachel H. standard also fares
favorably under the evaluative framework. The first and second factors strongly
reflect the first prong of the analysis. The first factor clearly reflects the
mainstreaming goal of the statute and Endrew’s progress language by assessing
educational benefits and providing a comparison between educational environments.
The second factor strengthens the connection by providing for the consideration of
non-academic growth. This is a recognition of the holistic aspect of the educational
process that includes social growth and general human development—matching the
spirit of Endrew.
The standard also fares very well under the feasibility prong. Like Daniel R.R.,
the Rachel H. standard considers the impact of mainstreaming on the regular
education classroom. This consideration provides for true feasibility, because it
allows school districts and education professionals to consider their school
community as a whole when determining placements. The fourth factor of the test is
truly what sets Rachel H. apart in terms of the feasibility prong. By explicitly calling
for the consideration of costs of mainstreaming, it allows school districts true
flexibility when dealing with strained resources. It also addresses a key policy issue
surrounding IDEA: proper federal funding. Thus, Rachel H. offers a comprehensive
response to the feasibility concern. It allows for consideration of the complexity and
challenges of administrating a school both in terms of obligations to maintain an
effective learning environment for all students and the significant issue of financial
130 Daniel R.R. v. Bd. of Educ., 874 F.2d 1036, 1039 (5th Cir. 1989).
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strain.
In sum, Rachel H. provides the most viable national LRE standard. It already
incorporates the subsequent Supreme Court guidance on IDEA in Endrew, as well as
the strong language favoring mainstreaming in the statute itself, and it offers real
discretion and deference to educators and administrators by effectively incorporating
feasibility. All the key stakeholders and their core concerns fare well under this
standard. Parents and children get a focus on real and holistic educational progress
and benefits. School administrators get to consider finances in an era when many
school system budgets are strained. The cost consideration addresses a key policy
concern of special education professionals (funding). Also, this group’s interests are
addressed with the consideration of professional responsibilities to all students by
looking at the impact on regular education classrooms.
VI.

LEGISLATIVE ACTION

The clarification of a judicial standard is important for resolving the open legal
question of how to apply the LRE mandate. However, as a statute, the primary
responsibility of clarifying and updating IDEA lies with Congress. Indeed, for a
significant portion of the statute’s history it did just that. The statute was regularly
reauthorized through 2004. Since then, attempts to reauthorize the statute have failed.
There have been proposals for reauthorization in Congress since then, primarily
focused on fully funding special education programs through legislation, including
the IDEA Full Funding Act. Yet, the various iterations of the IDEA Full Funding
Act131 have failed to advance in several Congresses.132
The failure of these reauthorization attempts is best understood with the context
of Congress’s struggle with the No Child Left Behind Act.133 The Act, which was
signed into law in 2002 was designed to improve educational opportunities for
disadvantaged students and required states to administer standardized tests for
evaluating school performance. Over time, the rigid federal standards and sanctions
led to the law becoming very unpopular. For example, schools for at-risk students
with 88% graduation rates were branded “low performance” under No Child Left
Behind’s standards.134 Yet, it took until 2015 for Congress to finally remove the
national provisions of the law and restore much of the control over public education
to the states.135 This fourteen-year span between the law’s enactment and its repeal,
despite strong criticism, demonstrates Congress’s slow, if existent, pace with
131 IDEA Full Funding Act, H.R. 2902, 115th Cong. (2017); IDEA Full Funding Act S.130, 114th Cong.
(2015); IDEA Full Funding Act, S. 2789, 113th Cong. (2013); IDEA Full Funding Act, S. 1403, 112th Cong.
(2011); IDEA Full Funding Act, S. 1652, 111th Cong. (2009).
132 Andrew Ujifusa, Full Funding for Special Education, EDUC. WEEK (June 15, 2017), http://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/campaign-k-12/2017/06/special_education_full_funding_congress_bipartisan.html.
133 No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425.
134 Motoko Rich & Tamar Lewin, No Child Left Behind Law Faces its Own Reckoning, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 20, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/22/us/politics/schools-wait-to-see-what-becomes-of-nochild-left-behind-law.html.
135 Lyndsey Layton, Obama Signs New K-12 Education Law that Ends No Child Left Behind, WASH.
POST (Dec. 10, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/obama-signs-new-k-12-educationlaw-that-ends-no-child-left-behind/2015/12/10/c9e58d7c-9f51-11e5-a3c5c77f2cc5a43c_story.html?utm_term=.be45f68dd4d1.
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updating education laws.
While the challenges to updating and reauthorizing IDEA in Congress are clear,
it is still Congress’s responsibility to ensure the law is responding to the needs of the
American people. For the LRE mandate, Congress should take its first opportunity
to codify the Rachel H. test and incorporate Endrew’s progress language. By doing
so, Congress would greatly aid the application of IDEA and realization of its goals.
Likewise, Congress can and should clarify the FAPE standard and expand upon
Endrew’s holding. Additionally, addressing the funding of special education
programs would meet the interests of key IDEA stakeholders. Overall, Congress
must revisit IDEA to strengthen it and bring it into accordance with the needs and
interests of children, parents, and schools.
CONCLUSION
Approaching five decades since its passage, IDEA is a noble and multifaceted
statute that has certainly improved the lives of children with special educational
needs. However, the “puzzle” construction of the provisions suggests that there is
still significant judicial work to be done establishing clear standards for the different
provisions. In particular, the least restrictive environment mandate of the statute does
not have a national standard and the federal circuits have developed different
frameworks. By addressing the legislative purpose of IDEA, the Supreme Court’s
precedent on the related free appropriate public education provision of IDEA, and
the realities faced by the stakeholders of modern special education, the test developed
by the Ninth Circuit in Rachel H. presents a viable national standard for LRE cases
and can help resolve IDEA litigation. Additionally, Rachel H. provides a blueprint
for Congress to clarify the LRE mandate once it eventually reauthorizes the statute.
Doing so will fulfill Congress’s responsibility to keep the statute up to date and
ensure that IDEA becomes a more positive force in American education.

